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VOC ofﬁcials as well as the Mughal administrators conducted their trading activities
in Bengal under different systems of jurisdiction. They both used local brokers and
ordinary villagers who became simultaneously part of the VOC and Mughal jur-
isdictions. But what happened when conﬂicts broke out between the Company and
the Mughal ofﬁcials? In which jurisdiction did the brokers then participate and why?
This article explores such questions through the study of two legal cases involving the
VOC in Bengal. It argues that the institutional binary of the VOC and the Mughal as
administrative entities were not stable in the face of personal interests and factional
ambitions.
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Secrets, rumours, friendships, rivalries, illicit relations, death and disease—the Indian
Ocean has been a site for centuries of action and encounter that cannot possibly be
captured, in its entirety, in a single chapter. As Sugata Bose rightly said, its history
and historiography are like “a seascape artist … [using] broad strokes of the brush”
which “dipped in the sources of many archives,” would eventually produce a more
“textured and complex picture.”1 Amidst this mosaic, Bengal remained one of the
steady regions maintaining its “amphibious” connections and contributing to the
existent diversity of the Indian Ocean.2 Chinese, Malay, Arab, Persian, and African
merchants, scholars, and travellers had frequented this region for a long time prior to
the arrival of the Portuguese, Dutch, French, English, and other European trading
companies.3 By the seventeenth century, Bengal had turned into a mosaic of different
trading groups, who set up their factories and forts along the banks of the river Ganga
and its tributaries.4
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The Dutch East India Company (Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie or the
VOC), too, asserted its presence here. Beginning from the early years of the seven-
teenth century, the VOC grew steadily in Bengal in contention with the English and
the other European companies.5 They had factories in Chinsurah (Hooghly), Malda,
Kasimbazaar, Dhaka, and other areas of Pipli, Balasore, and Patna, all of which were
clubbed under the VOC possessions in Bengal.6 These factories were supervised by a
director and his council, who resided at the chief factory of Chinsurah (Hooghly).7
Chinsurah came to be acquired by the VOC, along with Baranagore and Bazaar
Mirjapur in 1656, as a lease from the Mughal emperor.8
The nature of the Company’s presence in Bengal has been considered purely
commercial in the existent historiography.9 Studies on the interactions between the
VOC and the local merchants or the Mughal administrators have, therefore,
remained mostly conﬁned to a mercantile context. Works of scholars like Om Pra-
kash and F. S. Gaastra have examined these relations for Bengal. While Om Prakash
concluded that the Mughal merchant-ofﬁcials extorted the VOC and the local bro-
kers there, Gaastra argued that the VOC either competed or collaborated with the
local merchants.10 In a broader Indian Ocean setting, Ashin Das Gupta characterised
Indian merchants as being in a “partnership” with the Dutch East India Company.11
Subrahmanyam introduced a politico-economic angle by describing the occasional
clash between powerful Mughal “portfolio-capitalists” and VOC (and EIC) mer-
chants as “contained conﬂict.”12 New studies of the local-Dutch relations in Bengal
have been developed in recent years by scholars like Markus Vink and E. A. Alpers.
They have pointed out not only Bengal’s importance in the VOC slave trade in the
Indian Ocean but also its extended connection to trans-Atlantic slavery.13
These different labels – conﬂict, partnership, collaboration, competition – created
within the existent historiography conform to a neat, binary segregation of two
groups: the Indians and the Dutch. But in a ﬂuid setting like Bengal more
complex situations arose. For example, one wonders about the position of local
brokers who were bound by their contract to the Company’s legal purview while
simultaneously being subjected to theMughal jurisdiction in Bengal. What happened
in case of a conﬂict between them and the Company – was it resolved by the qazi (an
Islamic judge) or brought to the Company’s court at Batavia? Or in cases of conﬂicts
among VOC ofﬁcials, were the brokers getting involved in the Company’s legal
processes? Such questions can be answered by going beyond the segregation of the
“Indian” and “Dutch” to get a better understanding of the ambiguous worlds of these
actors. This article aims to do this by examining two such VOC cases involving extra-
Dutch actors with a focus on the way these cases were framed before being forwarded
to the courtroom to examine the process of gathering evidences and testimonies. In
the process, it becomes apparent that overlapping jurisdictions unleashed a process of
legal negotiations, adaptations, rejections, and appropriations that paradoxically
eliminated and yet reinforced the binary division of Dutch and Indian.
But before proceeding further, it is imperative to provide a glimpse of the jur-
isdictional situation of the VOC in seventeenth-century Mughal Bengal. All local
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inhabitants of the area, irrespective of their religious or ethnic distinctions, were
subjected toMughal jurisdiction for both civil and criminal cases.14 The VOC, on the
other hand, much like other foreign groups, was allowed to exercise their own jur-
isdiction over their own employees.15 It was in Batavia (modern day Jakarta) that the
highest court of justice, the Raad van Justitie (Council of Justice) was located. All
Dutch East India Company servants who were working in Asia and the Cape, as well
as all the vrijburgers (free-citizens) living in these places, were to be tried in the Raad
van Justitie.16 The Company was allowed to continue its commercial operations in
Bengal only if they abided by the rules of the Mughal ﬁrmans. This overlapping legal
coexistence was not a problem until conﬂicts broke out between the Mughal
administrators or the local brokers and the Company personnel. It is in this setting of
multiple legal dynamics that the following cases unfurl.
Case A: Partners in Crime
In the year 1684, the Heren XVII (the Company’s chief board of seventeen directors)
in the Dutch Republic sent an investigating committee to check into corruption
among its ofﬁcials working in the Indian factories of the westerkwartier (western
quarters). This included the coast of Coromandel, Malabar, Surat, Ceylon, and
Bengal; instructions were given to make special checks in Bengal.17 Hendrik Adriaan
van Reede tot Drakenstein (1636–1691) was appointed as the commissioner-general
of this committee.18 His position and power rested above all governors and directors
in the places he was supposed to visit and investigate. The instructions, nevertheless,
explicitly asked him to forward all allegations reported against any ofﬁcial to the
Hoge Regering (High Government), so that the Raad van Justitie had the ﬁnal say.19
Those beyond the Company’s jurisdiction suspected or found guilty of corruption
were to be left at Van Reede’s discretion. This possibly included the local brokers and
other villagers whose services were used by the Company, but over whom the VOC
had no absolute jurisdiction.
By 1686, the committee had investigated in Bengal and produced extensive reports
on persons suspected of corruption. On a quick glance, there was nothing in these
names to raise suspicion. There was, however, more to it when examined beyond the
surface. On tracing the network of friends and family of the persons accused by Van
Reede, a pattern could be immediately discerned. It was evident that only certain
people came to be targeted by the committee. The pattern that tied them all together
was their connection to the family Van Goens. The story then became much easier to
reconstruct. The governor-general of Batavia, Rijkloff van Goens (1678–1681), and
his son, Rijkloff van Goens Junior, had been strong political opponents of Van
Reede. Their differing opinions and open attacks on each other are apparent in the
VOC records that make no attempt to hide this hostility.20 It naturally spilled over
into the factions of their respective friends and families who were also a part of the
VOC administration. For instance, several charges were made against Jan Pit, the
gezaghebber (chief) of the factory in Kasimbazaar and assistant to the Company’s
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director in Bengal. Pit was accused of several offences by Van Reede, from toll
evasions to embezzlement of the Company’s treasury to forming a “kleine compag-
nie” (small company) for illegal trade.21 Martin Pit, who was the brother of Jan Pit,
happened to be a member of the Raad van Indië (Council of Batavia) at that time.
Martin Pit had been recommended for this position by Van Goens Jr., as is evident
from a letter written in 1683 to the Heren XVII. It left a vital clue to the close ties
between the Pit brothers and the family of Van Goens and explains Van Reede’s
targeting Jan Pit.22
It is necessary to understand that in the Dutch elite society of the seventeenth cen-
tury, political factions constituted the core of survival.23 Factions were mostly made up
of familial relations and close friends. Friendships were often strengthened through
intermarriage between families and were secured through distribution of ofﬁces among
members of the faction. This meant that fathers, sons, brothers, uncles, and sons-in-law
were not only family members but also colleagues at work who stuck together. They
formed familial-friendly factions that were underlined by common blood ties, similar
ideological beliefs, and political afﬁliations catalysed by shared interests for proﬁt and
honour. They recommended each other for appointments and promotions at work and
supported each other in times of personal crisis, offering ﬁnancial help to save social
positions. It was thus a mechanism of social defence designed to preserve public image
and higher status.24 The presence of multiple different factions meant that they often
clashed with each other, with most members of a particular faction becoming political
opponents of their rival faction. Though not a frequent practice, sometimes disgruntled
members could switch sides and change their factions. Factionalism, thus, remained an
indispensable tool for climbing the bureaucratic ladder and formed an integral part of
the VOC administration in Bengal.
Van Reede and his committee members had the open support of one of the pro-
minent directors of the Heren XVII, Joan Huydekoper van Maarsseveen indicating
that they belonged to the same faction.25 On the other hand, Van Reede’s allegations
were aimed not just against Pit, but also his friends Martin Huijsman (the former
VOC director of Bengal) and Nicolaas Schagen (the then-director of the factory at
Hooghly), suggesting that they all belonged to the same faction.26 The Van Goens
were also a part of this faction, as can be ascertained from the names of Huijsman and
Schagen appearing as recommendations in the same letter by Van Goens Jr. to the
Heren XVII.27 What was clearly at play here were factional forces of personal alli-
ance and revenge, under the façade of the larger institutional legal apparatus. It
demonstrates the use of institutional facilities and the initiation of legal procedures at
a formal level to serve informal ends. The committee under Van Reede was created as
an ofﬁcial measure with the intention of ﬁnding corruption among the VOC’s ser-
vants. But in practice, it was reduced to a political tool designed to catering to per-
sonal and factional interests.
To prove their allegations against Jan Pit and his associates, Van Reede and his
committee had to provide evidences. Many of these came in the form of testimonies
by local brokers working for the Company. In the reports of the committee, Van
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Reede explicitly named three Indian merchants who had collaborated with Pit and
the other ofﬁcials. They were Deepchand (written as Diepsient), Kalyan Das (as
Caljandas), and Jai Biswas (as Siaijwiswas), alias Ramsen (as Ramceen). By using
their account books, accompanied by testimonies of other brokers, the committee
tried to frame Pit (gezaghebber in 1683), Huijsman (director of Bengal in 1684), and
others of fraud in the Company.28 These ofﬁcials were charged with having traded
illegally in the name of their Indian brokers, while giving them certain commissions in
return.29 Another broker named Jadu (written as Satu/Satou) provided his testimony
to the committee against Pit and the three brokers, Biswas, Deepchand, and Das. In
the sources, his testimony appears to be translated from Bengali to Dutch, and reads
as follows:
“I, Jadu, working as a broker in the service of this Honourable Company have,
according to the order of the Honourable Lord Hendrik Adriaan van Reede, lord of
Mijdrecht, translated with the intention of being committed for the same purpose, the
words of Kalyan Das as they have been written in the abovementioned extract from
his account books concerning the trade that was conducted between him and the
Honourable Company’s servants since the year 1679 to the end of the year 1686 and
this has been compared with a corresponding note that has been signed by me, to
which I declare to agree as the truth; and I have signed it with my own hands. Hoogli,
15th April 1686 (written below)
This is the signature of Jadu, the broker of the Dutch Company.”30
In the same light, the name of Ramu Dutt (written as Rammoedet), a bania (mer-
chant) working as a factoor (gomoshta or agent) for the Company also surfaced in the
committee’s reports. Ramu Dutt confessed to being part of the illegal trade dealings
in 1683 when Pit used him to sell Pit’s private goods to Jai Biswas.31 Van Reede not
only praised Dutt for his testimony but also consolidated his position in the Com-
pany. Jadu, too, was highly recommended by Van Reede and assigned the task of
assisting in the supervision of textile quality control.32
The inclusion of these local testimonies was remarkable for two reasons. First, the
instructions of the Heren XVII for the committee included the following injunction:
“All the information and evidences should be so provided, that they can help the jurist
in making a judgement, by basing his decree or sentence on these available infor-
mation (as evidences). But if the aforementioned information comprises only of the
testimonies given by the moors and the heathens, or extracts from their account
books, they should be corroborated by the testimonies of honourable and trustworthy
Christians or others who sufﬁce (this criterion).”33
The fact that the testimony of brokers like Jadu were inherently untrustworthy,
despite the oath that they were required to take when entering the Company’s service,
implied a typical legal paradox.34 Bymaking the brokers take an oath to adhere to the
Company’s rules, they were subtly brought under the Dutch legal purview. But at the
same time, creating a hierarchy in their credibility as witnesses led the VOC to resort
to what Lauren Benton called out as the “politics of difference.”35 Extending jur-
isdiction over these brokers indicated their inclusion in the VOC legal structure. But
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at the same time, demeaning the weight of their testimonies triggered a formal
structuring of difference in the Company’s judicial lingo.36
A second aspect worth noting is the motive that led the likes of Jadu to actively
participate in the VOC’s legal forum. In the year before Van Reede, Isaac Soolmans
was appointed as the VOC commissioner for investigating the factories in Bengal. In
1684, a series of testimonies by the brokers revealed that the trio of Biswas, Deepc-
hand, and Das were appointed in the service of the Company from the time Jacob
Verburg became the VOC director in Bengal. Soolmans and his secretary, Adriaan
van Ommen, reported that this trio of brokers was chosen over Hajiram Tandon
(Hasjeram Thenden) and Murali Chaubey (Moereli Sjoebe), despite the two having
served the Company faithfully for a long time.37 Shortly thereafter, the broker Jadu
declared that Jan Pit had made Jai Biswas the most important broker. Biswas’s
dominance was so great that he managed to convince the Company to dismiss Jadu
from its service by accusing him of fraud.38 Soolmans reported that he later dis-
covered that Biswas was not to be trusted, and therefore wrote to Marten Huijsman,
the then-director, about his suspicions. Huijsman, who belonged to Pit’s faction,
replied to Soolmans by stating that Jadu and Biswas were in the same party and Jadu,
therefore, was not a friend of the Company’s.39 This earlier conﬂict involving Jadu
and the three brokers led by Biswas made its impact in 1686 (when Van Reede was the
commissioner), inducing Jadu to provide his willing testimonies against his fellow
brokers to the committee.
This opens up the world of local merchants in Bengal, and paints a picture equally
dotted with rivalries and factionalism. Family and friendships here, too, tended to
form an essential part of mercantile bonds, as is evident from numerous examples
among brokers who worked for the Company. Often brothers, sons, uncles, or friends
of a certain broker replaced him, when he could not continue working in his position.
One of the brokers mentioned above, Kalyan Das, was the son of Rangordas, who
had also worked for the VOC.40 The young son of Deepchand named Kamalnayan
was already considered to be in line to be hired as a broker by the Company, when he
came of age.41 The son of the Company’s chief weaver Bolleram, named Ghana-
shyam (written as Genesam), also worked for the Company.42 In the autobiography
of a seventeenth-century bania merchant, Banarasidas from Jaunpur, such bonds
were further conﬁrmed. Banarasidas’s friend Dharamdas was also his business
partner.43 That family members could also be trading partners is evident: Banar-
asidas’s father, Kharagsen, invested in a joint business with his uncle, Sundardas.44
Examples from the Bengali literature of the time also provide hints about such
familial mercantile bonds.45 The fact that local merchants preferred to keep their
family ties within their communities and friends is evident from the incident of
Dhanapati’s marriage with Khulana, in the Chandimangal.46 The author, Mukun-
daram, narrated how Khulana’s father, himself a merchant from the gondhobanik
(perfumes and aromatic commodities trader) community explored all possibilities of
a suitable groom for his daughter, keeping in mind the condition that the groom had
to be exclusively from the same trading group.
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Clearly then, the Indian merchants were also divided among themselves into
competing factions that could merge their conﬂicts with the ongoing factional politics
of the Company (see Appendix for Case A). With factions revolving around families
and friends on both sides, it is possible to understand why the VOC in Bengal
accommodated the local brokers in their legal space and why the brokers, on their
part, participated in the Company’s legal trials. Both groups often had overlapping
interests that tied them to one stretched network for fulﬁlling their individual and
factional ambitions. This case brings forth this point in the backdrop of the VOC’s
pluralistic legal existence. It shows the use of the Company’s formal legal apparatus
to serve personal politics while carefully including extra-Dutch actors in its jurisdic-
tion. At the same time, it shows the mechanism of creating differences through
reduced credibility of the local brokers’ testimonies in their legal participation.
Notwithstanding such differences, the merchants in Bengal actively engaged with the
Company’s legal administration to serve their own competitive needs in alliance with
the Company’s numerous factions, which dismissed the binary assertions of “Dutch”
and “Indian”.
Case B: The Death of Bolleram’s Widow
If ever there was a case in the Company’s legal history that involved all layers of
political and judicial authorities – from the Raad van Justitie to the qazi and from the
Heren XVII to the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb – then this was it. Both Om Prakash
and F.S. Gaastra have written about this case.47 But the Indian side of the story was
quickly passed over, missing the nuances of this unique legal encounter in 1672. It all
began when Bolleram Sjoudhuri (or possibly Boloram or Bhole Ram Chowdhuri),
the Company’s masterhaspelaar (seniorHeren XVII in the Republic).
With both the Mughal and the Dutch authorities involved, the case was presented
at both the court of the qazi in Bengal and the Raad van Justitie in Batavia.48As the
case proceeded to the higher authorities and investigations began things becamemore
and more interesting. The ﬁrst accusations seem to have come from Herman Fentzel
(koopman or ofﬁcial in the rank of a merchant in Hooghly) and Jacob Verburg
(gezaghebber at Kasimbazaar), who announced having seen Ranst torturing the
woman. Being present during the interrogation, they saw him hanging the widow
with her hands tied with ropes for an hour and treating her like a slave. According to
their testimony, thus, the widow succumbed to this torture. The fact that allegations
were raised against Ranst by Verburg and Fentzel proves that they were not on good
terms with the director and presumably belonged to rival political factions. The
animosity possibly owed its origin to the days when Ranst ﬁrst arrived in Bengal in
1669. Between 1671 and 1672, he was openly accused by Fentzel and Verburg of
illegal trade, when the commissioner Willem Volger was present there.49 But the
friendship between Ranst and Volger prevented the latter from bringing any charges
against Ranst. Such politics of factional allegations which we saw at play earlier now
makes its intrusion in this incident.
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At the qazi’s court, Verburg and Fentzel’s allegations were strengthened by the
accusations of Malik Qasim and Shaista Khan.50 They blamed the Company under
Ranst’s authority of being reckless and not paying the due customs. Interestingly,
they also accused the VOC of causing damage to the inhabitants of the villages in
Bengal.51 The diwan (revenue and ﬁnance ofﬁcial) of the province, Rai Nandalal, in
fact sided with Verburg, claiming that the directors before Ranst had never been such
a problem and had not caused so much trouble as Ranst did in Bengal.52 In his
defence, Ranst provided an apologia where he mentioned that Shaista Khan was
anxious to protect his own trade from being hampered by the Company’s presence
and, therefore, made these false allegations.53 Besides this, he along with his assistant
Pieter Hofmeester, sought the help of Binod Ray (written as Binootray), the son-in-
law of Bolleram’s widow. Binod Ray said that his sister-in-law had consumed opium
because of the disgrace she faced after the interrogation at the Company’s lodge. This
caused her death, rather than the allegations of torture. The onderchirurgijn (junior
physician) of the Company conﬁrmed to this by claiming to have found traces of
poison in the widow’s blood. In addition, some Mughal administrators helped Ranst
draft a complaint against Malik Qasim to be sent to the emperor Aurangzeb.54 They
were possibly, as Gaastra concluded, men waiting for a chance to displace Malik
Qasim from his position. This case was eventually settled when the Heren XVII
decided to pay the money demnded, freeing Ranst of the charges brought against
him.55 But they simultaneously sent Johannes Bacharus to the emperor Aurangzeb to
plead their case and reclaim the money. (Ranst, nevertheless, had to be removed from
his directorship, as fresh charges of ﬁnancial mismanagement and illegal trade
brought against him were proven – a story that is beyond the scope of our current
discussion).56
This quintessential example of how jurisdictional overlaps led to problems in
issuing clear legal pronouncements reveal two common factors, as seen in the pre-
vious case also. This includes the interplay of factional forces among Company
ofﬁcials while dispensing formal justice at Batavia, and the use of local agency and
factional strife, combined with the Company ofﬁcials’ own factional politics (see
Appendix for Case B). In this incident, the factional struggle of Verburg-Fentzel
against Volger-Ranst-Hofmeester determined how and where the allegations were to
be made.Mughal administrators likeMalik Qasim or Shaista Khan were no ordinary
broker but powerful “merchant-ofﬁcials,” who could force the very Company to
bend to their jurisdiction.57 Yet factional differences among themselves led some of
these men to make room for the Company’s legal politics within the Mughal
administrative framework.
But there is another element in this case that needs to be pointed out. This was the
refusal of the Heren XVII to accept Ranst’s faults. The Haagse besogne (committee
for handling the papers received from Asia) concluded that Ranst was innocent and
had been falsely framed by Shaista Khan and his ofﬁcials.58 It revealed the Com-
pany’s tendency to minimise the credibility of alternative, contesting legal authorities
like the Islamic court relative to the VOC court. This is also clearly reﬂected in generic
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VOC discourse about the inefﬁcient administration of justice in the qazi’s court.
James Tracy points out how VOC ofﬁcials regularly denounced the legal system of
the Mughal empire as inferior to the Christian ethics and justice manifested in Dutch
laws.59 A farce was made of these claims when Company ofﬁcials actually tried to
break into the legal machinery of the Mughals by offering bribes to the qazi or the
concerned parties. They spoke about this openly, while simultaneously venting their
frustrations about their failed attempts to disturb the qazi’s administration.60 But
their consistent efforts in writing about the “difference” of the Mughal legal system
while trying to get a hold on it through informal means unfurled the process of
pushing, goading, negotiating, and adapting to assert their formal presence in the
midst of plural jurisdictions.
Conclusion
Two cases of the VOC administering justice against its own employees have been
examined here, in the backdrop of seventeenth-century Mughal Bengal. The process
of their formation and execution with the involvement of extra-Dutch local actors as
witnesses and plaintiffs has been studied. Exploring the legal dimensions of the
VOC’s presence in Bengal highlights the ambiguities and overlaps in exercising the
Company’s laws at a time and space where the Mughal jurisdiction was also simul-
taneously in operation. Unravelling the way these cases were framed and presented at
the VOC court, therefore, helps bring about the nuances of the local and VOC rela-
tions. Three major aspects could be discerned from the cases discussed above. First, it
was evident that the Company’s formal legal machinery served as a façade for its
inner personal factions. In both of the cases analysed here, Company ofﬁcials
remained embroiled in factional strife that culminated in raising allegations against
opponent colleagues at the court in Batavia. Initiating a legal procedure in such
instances, however, often required bringing in local parties to the story to frame the
charges. This, in turn, increased the permeability of the VOC jurisdictional domain
and made it more vulnerable to external penetration. But at the same time, non-
Dutch actors were not ofﬁcially allowed to be brought before the Company’s legal
forum. Yet there were occasions when their participation was inevitable or when the
VOC ofﬁcials in Bengal could themselves become an involved party in the trials at the
Mughal qazi’s court, as exempliﬁed in the second case above. In all these circum-
stances, the Heren XVII denied the Mughal legal administration and non-Christian
Company ofﬁcials their full credibility on paper. Here we see a second aspect: the
Company’s tendency to subtly assert its position in the legal hierarchy above alter-
native jurisdictional domains and non-Dutch actors. The local brokers nevertheless
participated in these legal processes, not just because of their contractual obligations
to the VOC but also in their own interests. As has been shown here, they themselves
were driven by competitive factional forces that could be merged with the Company’s
inner administrative factionalism. Thus, the third aspect of the Company’s presence
was this element of local participation, triggered by the brokers’ own personal and
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factional ambitions. By summing up these arguments, it can be concluded that the
legal practices of the VOC in Bengal went beyond the binaries of “Dutch” and
“Indian” and were more muddled and dynamic than has been perceived in the his-
toriography so far. And yet it also shows how this encounter formalised “difference”
on paper through the informal means of negotiations, adaptations, and confronta-
tions during its plural jurisdictional existence.
APPENDIX FOR CASE A
Hendrik Adriaan van Reede
(Commissioner-general of the investigation
committee from 1684 to 1691)
X                           Rijkloff van Goens Sr.
(Governor-general of 
Batavia from 1676 to 1682)
Huydekoper van Maarsseeveen
(Director in the Heren XVII)
Rijkloff van Goens Jr., 
son of Rijkloff van Goens
(Commissioner of Cape)
Isaac Soolmans
(Second in rank in the Van Reede committee
and former commissioner of Bengal)
Jan Pit
(gezaghebber in Kasimbazaar,
former VOC director of Bengal)
Marten Huijsman
(former VOC director of Bengal)
(brokers)
Jadu
(brokers)
Deepchand
Ramu Dutt
Jai Biswas
Hajiram Tandon
Kalyan Das
Murali Chaubey
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